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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
LUKE ZACHARY BAKER, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Case No. 20060218-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE IS SEEKING AN ABRUPT CHANGE IN SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE LAW BY URGING THIS COURT TO ALLOW THE 
DETENTION OF PASSENGERS WITHOUT ANY SHOWING OF 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
The State urges this Court to abandon prior Fourth Amendment and article I, 
section 14 precedents, and to establish a new and divergent bright-line rule authorizing 
police officers to detain passengers during a traffic stop without any reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity. However, the State's bright-line rule fails to balance the 
constitutional protections of individual liberty with the interests of officer safety and 
Baker asserts that current and controlling case law provides the proper balance and there 
is no need for change. Moreover, the State completely ignores the undisputed facts of 
this case which show that Baker was illegally detained in violation of his constitutional 
1 
rights. Accordingly, the trial court erred by finding that Baker was not illegally detained 
and that ruling should be reversed. 
A. A passenger may only be detained upon reasonable suspicion that he is 
engaged in criminal activity. 
Baker asserts that the State's bright-line rule fails to properly protect citizens' 
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and thus violates the common tenets of 
the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 14. 
The procedures for permissible encounters between police officers and citizens are 
well established: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions so long as the 
citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed. 
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, f 10, 998 P.2d 274 (citations omitted). 
It is abundantly clear that before a police officer may detain any person, including 
a passenger, there must be a showing of at least reasonable suspicion that the person has 
been or will be engaged in criminal activity. Under the Fourth Amendment and article I, 
section 14, neither a driver nor a passenger "may be detained except upon reasonable 
suspicion, and the scope of the detention must be limited to addressing the articulated 
grounds for the stop." State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, f 15, 107 P,3d 706 {citing State v. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132-33 (Utah 1994) and State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 764 
(Utah 1991)). A bright-line rule otherwise, giving police authority to detain a driver or 
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passenger without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, clearly violates constitutional 
protections and is wholly unsupported by controlling case law. 
While police officers have a valid concern for their safety in almost all aspects of 
their work, including traffic stops, neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the United States 
Supreme Court have held that the inherent dangers of a traffic stop justify the detention 
of passengers without a showing or reasonable suspicion that the passenger is engaged in 
criminal activity. In fact, all controlling case law provides that police must have 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before detaining passengers. 
B. The State's reliance on other jurisdictions to support its bright-line rule is 
misplaced. 
The State is unable to furnish any controlling case law to support the position that 
police officers may detain passengers during a traffic stop without any showing that the 
passengers are engaged in criminal activity. Despite the State's assertion otherwise, 
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), and most of the other cases relied upon by the 
State do not support the proposition that police are justified in detaining passengers 
without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
The State asserts that Wilson provides that the "Fourth Amendment authorizes an 
officer who observes a traffic offense committed by a vehicle driver to lawfully detain 
any vehicle passengers until the lawful objectives of the traffic stop are completed." 
(Aplle. Br. at 13). Wilson stands for no such position. The question before the Wilson 
Court was whether the rule oi Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), that a police 
officer "may as a matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his 
3 
vehicle, extends to passengers as well." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 410. The Court analyzed 
officer safety concerns in traffic stops and concluded that "an officer making a traffic 
stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop." Id. at 
413-15. The Court did not address the issue of whether officers may detain passengers 
until the traffic stop is completed; it simply held that officers can require passengers to 
exit the vehicle during a traffic stop. The State's assertion otherwise, that Wilson 
provides officers with authority to detain passengers without reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity, is unfounded. 
Any reliance of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) to support the position 
that police may detain a passenger during a traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity is also unfounded. Summers clearly dealt with the execution of a search 
warrant, where probable cause has already been established that criminal activity is afoot. 
There was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to suspect that any of the 
passengers, especially Baker, were involved in criminal activity justifying a detention in 
this case. 
State v. James, 2000 UT 80, 13 P.3d 576 also does not support the position that 
police may detain passengers without a showing of reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. In fact, while James does state that the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement lowers the privacy expectation of passengers, the Utah Supreme Court 
reiterates that "officers may temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants upon 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the purpose of conducting a limited 
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investigation of the suspicion." Id. at f 10 (emphasis added). Reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity is a necessary factor to justify the detention of any passenger. 
The State's reliance on State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 100, 68 P.3d 1052, is also 
misplaced. While Valdez did allow the very short detention of a person in a home for 
officer safety reasons, this Court made explicitly clear that it was not abandoning the rule 
that "even a 'minimal intrusion' requires the police officer to provide a basis for the 
action," i.e. "specific facts to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Id. at 
f s l 9 , 2 0 . 
In Valdez, as the officers followed the arrestee into the home to retrieve clothing, 
they noticed a man apparently asleep on the bed. 2003 UT App 100 at %f. The officers 
could not see the man's hands, so they shook the man and woke him up and told the man 
to show them his hands. Id. After the man showed the officers his hands, they asked for 
his identification, to which an investigation was pursued to discover the man's identity. 
Id. at fflf's 3-4, 7. A warrants check ultimately revealed an outstanding warrant. Id. at ^ 4. 
This Court ruled that the initial short detention, where the officers shook the man 
to awake him and then asked him to show them his hands was reasonable "for the sole 
purpose of 'exercising unquestioned command of the situation,'" and to "ensure that no 
harm came to either the officers" or other individuals and that the short detention was not 
conducted for the purpose of any further investigation. Valdez, 200 J UT App 100 at \ s 
18, 19 (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03). However, once the man complied and 
showed the officers his hands, this Court ruled that the safety concerns were alleviated 
and any further detention or investigation was a violation of the Fourth Amendment since 
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the officer safety justification may not be extended beyond the scope of the initial 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Id. at f^'s 19-20. 
Valdez does not support the State's assertion that police are justified in detaining 
passengers without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In fact, this Court made it 
abundantly clear that the rule applied in State v. Johnson (reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity necessary to detain passengers) is still applicable. Valdez, 2003 UT App 
100 at 120. 
Being unable to provide any controlling case law to support its position, the State 
looks to other jurisdictions and asserts that many have adopted the rule the State now 
seeks (Aplle at 15). However, of the cases which the State relies upon, only a few 
jurisdictions have actually adopted the bright-line rule the State urges this Court to adopt. 
Most of the jurisdictions cited by the State allow the detention of the passengers only 
after an articulable showing that police safety is at issue. From the jurisdictions relied 
upon by the State, it appears that only Montana and North Carolina have actually adopted 
the bright-line rule sought by the State. Baker presents here a brief synopsis of each case 
the State refers to: 
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 419 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2005) [driver did not 
immediately pull over and passenger voluntarily exited vehicle and when ordered 
to get back in the vehicle, passenger threw a gun out of the window]; United States 
v. Clark, 337 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) [officer observed two men fighting in the 
street near a car parked on the wrong side of the street with door open, lights on 
and engine running, and defendant standing on side of street watching fight. 
Officer asked the three men if they were passengers in the car and defendant 
admitted he was a passenger. Officer ordered all three men back into the car and 
ordered them to keep their hands where he could see them]; Rogala v. District of 
Columbia, 161 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998) [Rogala brought civil suit where she 
voluntarily left the stopped car while officer was conducting field sobriety test of 
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driver and officer ordered her back into the car. The court found that the officer 
acted reasonably in ordering passenger back into the car so as to not interfere with 
field sobriety test and for officer safety reasons]; United States v. Moorefield, 111 
F.3d 10 (3rd Cir. 1997) [passenger attempted to exit vehicle but was ordered to 
remain in the vehicle and show his hands; passenger refused to show his hands, 
leaned back and shoved something down towards his waist and then pushed his 
upper-body out of the window; officer again ordered passenger to remain in the 
vehicle and show his hands; after again not complying, officer ordered passenger 
out of vehicle and pat-down search revealed pistol in passenger's waistband]; 
Carter v. State, 494 S.E.2d 108 (Ga. App. 1997) [car stopped on suspicion of drug 
dealing in drug neighborhood and passenger immediately exited vehicle and began 
to walk away; officer ordered passenger back into the car and passenger ran 
away]; People v. Gonzalez, 704 N.E.2d 375 (111. 1998) [officer stopped car in 
known crime area and passenger "abruptly" exited the vehicle and began walking 
away; officer ordered passenger back in the vehicle and asked passenger before he 
re-entered the vehicle if he had a concealed weapon, to which passenger said yes, 
and a gun was found], cert, denied, 528 U.S. 825 (1999); State v. Roberts, 943 
P.2d 1249 (Mont. 1997) [officer apparently told passenger to remain in vehicle 
and then ran warrants check on passenger in vehicle]; People v. Forbes, 283 A.D. 
92 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) [vehicle stopped in high crime area and passenger 
attempted to exit the vehicle while officers asked the driver for registration; 
officers ordered passenger to remain in vehicle and when officers returned to their 
patrol car, they heard the sound of 9mm handgun being loaded in the stopped car 
and subsequently retrieved the gun on the passenger]; State v. Shearin, 612 S.E.2d 
371 (N.C. App. 2005) [during traffic stop in poorly lit area and while field sobriety 
tests were conducted on the driver, passenger asked second officer if he were free 
to leave and officer said no; officer then noticed that passenger appeared to be 
intoxicated and saw an open beer bottle in the floor board];and State v. Hodges, 
631 N.W.2d 206 (S.D. 2001) [holding that it is reasonable to require passengers to 
temporarily remain at the scene of a stop until the officer is able to assess the 
situation; here the passenger immediately left the vehicle and did not respond to 
officer's commands to stop]. 
Notably, there are differing views and the cases are not as clear cut as the State 
believes. Some jurisdictions hold that the Fourth Amendment is violated when a police 
officer detains a passenger during a traffic stop, unless there is independent reasonable 
suspicion that the passenger is involved in criminal activity. See, e.g., Dennis v. State, 
345 Md. 649, 693 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Md. 1997), cert denied, Maryland v. Dennis, 522 
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U.S. 928, 139 L. Ed. 2d 255, 118 S. Ct. 329 (1997) (passenger who attempts to walk 
away from traffic stop cannot be detained absent reasonable suspicion of dangerousness 
or criminal activity); Wilson v. State, 734 So. 2d 1107, 1112 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999), cert. 
denied, 529 U.S. 1124, 146 L. Ed. 2d 820, 120 S. Ct. 1996 (2000) (same); Walls v. State, 
714 N.E.2d 1266, 1267-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (same). Other jurisdictions hold that the 
Fourth Amendment is violated if police order the passenger to remain in the vehicle 
unless the passenger poses an articulable threat or danger to the officer. See, e.g., State v. 
Mendez, 970 P.2d 722 (Wash. 1999). Still other jurisdictions allow passengers to be 
detained due to the inherent risk associated with all traffic stops. See Shearin, 612 S.E.2d 
at 378. However, as the dissent in Shearin points out, the actual trend is directly opposite 
from what the State is seeking. Id. at 383. There must be reasonable suspicion that the 
passenger is engaged in criminal activity before the passenger can be detained. 
Accordingly, the State's assertion that Wilson and its progeny authorized the 
police officers in this case to detain Baker despite any reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity is not accurate. The facts show, as will be set forth more clearly in point III, that 
the officers had no reasonable suspicion that Baker was engaged in any criminal activity. 
Therefore, Baker's detention was unlawful and any evidence obtained after Baker's 
illegal detention should have been suppressed. 
C. Police officers may not detain passengers without reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Even though a few jurisdictions have held that police officers are permitted to 
order passengers to remain in the vehicle without any showing of criminal activity, such a 
8 
bright-line rule violates article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The Utah Supreme 
Court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized that article I, Section 14 
provides greater protections than the Fourth Amendment. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 
2005 UT 13,1fl 1, 122 P.3d 506; revers 'd by, Brigham City v. Stuart,\26 S. Ct. 1943 
(2006); see also State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, 996 P.2d 546. Baker asserts that article I, 
section 14 provides that police officers may not detain passengers during a traffic stop 
unless there is reasonable suspicion that the passenger is engaged in criminal activity. 
In State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545 (Utah App. 1997), this Court noted that the Utah 
Supreme Court has interpreted article I, section 14 to provide greater protections than the 
Fourth Amendment in order to shield "Utah citizens 'from the vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal courts." Id. at 549 (quoting 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988)). Accordingly, an independent state 
constitutional departure from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is necessary when 
"significant inconsistencies or confusion" exists in search and seizure law. Id. 
While Utah law clearly shows that passengers may be detained only upon a 
showing of reasonable suspicion that they are engaged in criminal activity, the federal 
law, as shown above, is in considerable confusion and the United States Supreme Court 
has not resolved the confusion. Since the State is urging this Court to adopt a radically 
different bright-line rule than the present rule, it may be necessary to depart from federal 
search and seizure jurisprudence to ensure that the citizens' rights are protected. 
Guidance in interpreting article I, section 14 comes from State v. Larocco, 749 
P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion). There, Justice Durham set forth a framework 
9 
to interpret article I, section 14 and exceptions to the warrant requirement in order to 
"simplify, if possible, the search and seizure rules so that they can be more easily 
followed by the police and the courts, and at the same time, provide the public with 
consistent and predictable protection against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 
469. Justice Durham further observed that observed that "if article I, section 14 applies, 
warrantless searches will be permitted only where they satisfy their traditional 
justification, namely, to protect the safety of the police or the public or to prevent the 
destruction of evidence." Id. at 469-70. 
Baker asserts that Utah's current interpretation of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence sufficiently balances the interests of officer safety and protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, and if necessary, this framework should be applied to 
interpreting article I, section 14. As stated above in point l.A, the detention of a 
passenger is unreasonable unless police have a reasonable suspicion that the passenger is 
engaged in criminal activity. See e.g., Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at f 10; see also Johnson, 
805 P.2d at 764. 
As previously set forth in Baker's original brief and as will be set forth further in 
point III, the evidence shows that the officers had no reasonable suspicion that Baker was 
engaged in criminal activity when he was detained. Therefore, Baker's detention was 
unlawful and the evidence should have been suppressed. 
In conclusion, the State's bright-line rule provides inadequate protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The current and controlling search and seizure law 
already adequately balances officer safety concerns with Fourth Amendment and article I, 
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section 14 rights. Moreover, the current rule, that officers must have reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity before detaining a passenger is easily followed by the 
police and the courts since the same rule is applicable to other search and seizure law. 
Additionally, any change in the current law would only bring confusion to police officers 
since there would be different rules under different search and seizure situations. The 
simple and straightforward rule outlined in Ray defining the scope of permissible 
encounters between police and citizens is easy to understand and easy to apply. There is 
no need to bring more confusion to search and seizure law. 
II. THE STATE MISTAKENLY ASSERTS THAT PASSENGERS MAY 
BE DETAINED UNTIL THE POLICE CONCLUDE THEIR ENTIRE 
INVESTIGATION OF A TRAFFIC STOP 
The State wrongly asserts that the police were justified in detaining Baker until 
after the driver was arrested and after the drug dog was called to conduct a search 
incident to the arrest of the driver. The State's assertion is unsupported by any case law 
and lacks merit. The facts clearly show that Baker was detained in violation of the law. 
First, Baker has maintained all along that he was free to leave at the inception of 
the traffic stop and the officers illegally detained him by not allowing him to leave (R. 
37-40, 77-80). Notably, the State has not shown any controlling case law contradicting 
his right to leave the scene since there was no reasonable suspicion that he was engaged 
in any criminal activity. However, in order to show as a matter of law that he was 
illegally detained, Baker has continued to assert that the police unlawfully detained him 
once the initial purposes of the stop were concluded (i.e., the driver was arrested), once 
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the officers confiscated his personal possession, and when the officers had him wait in 
the vehicle until the K-9 unit arrived to search the vehicle (Aplt. Br. at 11). 
A. The right to search the vehicle does not provide justification for illegally 
detaining Baker. 
The State next asserts that because the driver's arrest was allegedly ongoing, 
Baker was never illegally detained and Baker failed to show that his detention prior to the 
K-9 arrival was illegal (Aplle. Br. at 17-18). To support this argument, the State asserts 
that Baker failed to properly challenge the trial court's findings as clearly erroneous and 
failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings (Aplle. Br. at 17-18). 
Baker does not challenge the fact that the officers arrested the driver before the K-
9 unit arrived and that the officers were still "dealing" with the driver after the K-9 unit 
arrived (Aplle Br. at 17). However, the trial court never found, as the State apparently 
alleges, that the arrest of the driver was not complete until the passenger compartment 
was searched (Aplle Br. at 19). In fact, the trial court specifically found that the driver 
was arrested before the K-9 unit arrived (R. 72).l In any event, the mere fact that the 
officers handcuffed and arrested the driver and then called for a K-9 unit to search the 
vehicle for drugs in no way authorized the officers to continue the illegal detention of 
Baker. 
The State confuses New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) and the lawful search 
of the passenger department incident to a custodial arrest of the occupant of a vehicle and 
1
 It appears that the State has failed to properly challenge the trial court's factual finding that the 
driver was arrested before the K-9 unit arrived (Aplle. Br. at 17-18; citing State v. Worwood, 
2005 UT App 539). Thus, any argument that the "driver's arrest commenced—but not 
concluded—prior to the dog sniff is unavailing (Aplle. Br. at 21). 
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the ability to detain the occupant since the scope of the stop has been expanded, with the 
unlawful detention of a passenger. While it is clear that police may lawfully search the 
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to arrest of the driver, the arrest does not 
provide reasonable suspicion to suspect that Baker or any of the other passengers were 
engaged in criminal activity. It matters not whether the police were authorized to search 
the driver's vehicle incident to arrest; the search of the vehicle incident to arrest does not 
magically bestow upon officers the right to detain Baker when there is no reasonable 
suspicion that Baker is engaged in criminal behavior. The State's whole argument on this 
point only confuses the issue and is a red herring. 
B. State v. Chism is applicable and directly on point and Cabettas is not 
contrary. 
The State asserts that State v. Chism supports its bright-line rule and its position 
that Baker was not illegally detained, and the State further asserts that the facts in Chism 
are different from the facts in this case (Aplle Br. at 19-20). While it is obvious that the 
facts in Chism are not exactly similar to the facts in the present case, Baker asserts that it 
is incomprehensible to suggest that Chism allows for the detention of passengers without 
any evidence that passengers are engaged in criminal activity. 
Baker relies upon Chism for the general principle that "[n]o person may be 
detained except upon reasonable suspicion, and the scope of the detention must be limited 
to addressing the articulated grounds for the stop." Chism, 2005 UT App 41 at [^15; (Aplt. 
Br. at 14). Moreover, this Court clearly held that while detaining the driver for purposes 
associated with the initial stop are justified, any further detention of the passengers is 
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unlawful where there is no continuing reasonable suspicion that the passengers are 
engaged in criminal activity. Id. at Tf's 15, 21-22. 
Under Chism, if the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Baker (which 
Baker denies), the officers were required to investigate whatever act gave them the belief 
that Baker was engaged in criminal activity. See Chism, 2005 UT App 41 at % 15. And 
assuming that reasonable suspicion existed to detain Baker, "the detention must cease at 
the point where the suspicion becomes unreasonable." Id; see also Valdez, 2003 UT App 
100 at | ' s 19-20. Notably, none of the officers present testified that they had any 
reasonable suspicion, let alone a hunch, that Baker was engaged in criminal activity. 
Accordingly, Chism holds that Baker's detention was illegal. 
Additionally, for the reasons stated in Baker's original brief, Illinois v. Cabelles, 
543 U.S. 405 (2005) is not contrary to controlling case law which provides that police 
must have reasonable suspicion that a passenger is engaged in criminal activity before 
detaining the passenger (Aplt. Br. at 16-17). 
The State's argument that the officers had the right to detain Baker up until the 
time he was frisked simply because the driver's arrest was allegedly ongoing is wholly 
without merit. Moreover, the States argument that Baker's detention was lawful under 
Cabellas "because it was based on the officers' reasonable suspicion that the driver 
continued to be involved in drugs" is also without merit (Aplle Br. at 22). There was no 
indication that the driver was in possession of any controlled substance prior to the K-9 
unit arriving and the State is unable to point to any reasonable suspicion otherwise. 
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Moreover, there is simply nothing to connect Baker's detention to the driver's arrest. The 
State's argument is simply unsustainable. 
III. THE POLICE HAD NO REASONABLE BASIS TO DETAIN 
BAKER 
Baker asserts that the police officers illegally detained him prior to the K-9 search 
of the vehicle and prior to being frisked for drugs. The illegal detention began at the 
inception of the stop and continued until he was frisked for drugs. Baker should have 
been allowed to leave the scene well before the K-9 searched the vehicle and well before 
he was frisked for drugs. Any evidence obtained after Baker's rights were violated is 
inadmissible. 
A. The State's probable cause to search analysis is not applicable to this case. 
The State presents this Court with a detailed legal argument that the police were 
justified in believing that Baker possessed drugs and that he was armed and dangerous 
(Aplle Br. at 22-36). Despite the lengthy legal presentation, the State fails to realize or 
consider that Baker was illegally detained before the K-9 search indicated on the exterior 
of the vehicle. Because Baker was illegally detained, the State's entire legal analysis is 
pointless since all evidence obtained is tainted by the prior illegal detention. See State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ [62, 62 P.3d 650 ("evidence obtained by police exploitation of 
prior illegality is tainted by the violation of a person's constitutional rights"). 
The State cites to Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), to support its 
argument that there was probable cause to search Baker because the dog indicated on the 
vehicle (Aplle. Br. at 24-29). The State forgets, however, that in Pringle, the officer 
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stopped the car, asked the driver for the registration, and when the-driver opened the 
glove compartment, the officer saw "a large amount of rolled-up money in the glove 
compartment." Id. at 368. The Supreme Court did not address whether or not the 
passenger was lawfully detained at this point, and the passenger did not argue the point, 
obviously because it was clear that there was reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
passenger was engaged in criminal activity since large amounts of rolled-up money are 
certainly consistent with drug transactions. Id. at 368-374. Instead, the question before 
the Court was whether there was a basis to arrest the passenger. Id. at 369-70. The 
Supreme Court correctly found that there was probable cause, because once the officer 
saw the rolled-up money, he searched the car and found drugs, and then he asked all the 
individuals regarding ownership of the money and drugs and none of the individuals 
admitted ownership. Id. 
Accordingly, Pringle is not applicable to this case since there was a basis to detain 
the passenger in Pringle but there was no basis to detain Baker since there was absolutely 
no evidence that Baker was engaged in criminal activity or posed a threat to the officers. 
Thus, the State's entire analysis regarding probable cause to search is not applicable for 
the simple reason of the prior illegal detention. See Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at f 62. 
B. No evidence was presented that Baker was armed and presently dangerous. 
The State finally asserts that the trial court's ruling can be upheld on the 
independent grounds that the frisk "was justified because the police reasonably suspected 
defendant—and the other passengers-were armed and dangerous" (Aplle. Br. at 30). The 
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State conveniently produces facts not in the record and asks this Court to ignore the 
officers' own testimony and observations. 
A quick recitation of the relevant facts shows that the State's argument lacks 
merit. At the preliminary hearing, only Detective Robertson testified (R. 149). After 
Robertson pulled the vehicle over for no plate light, he approached the vehicle and 
observed a sheathed knife on the center passenger in the back seat (R. 149: 13). 
Robertson testified that he believed the passenger legally possessed the knife (R. 149: 
13). There was no evidence presented that Baker possessed the legal knife (R. 149). 
Robertson informed the other officers about the knife and the officers then confiscated 13 
knives from the passengers while the passengers remained in the vehicle (R. 149: 13, 14, 
21). 
Apparently, Robertson offered no justification for illegally detaining Baker other 
than the K-9 indicating on the vehicle (R. 149: 18-19). Robertson stated that Baker was 
searched because the dog indicated on the car, and later added that Baker was also 
searched "[b]ecause of known knife issues" (R. 149: 12, 13). However, Robertson was 
did not know if Baker was in possession of any knife (R. 149: 14). Robertson admitted 
that the only reason he thought safety was an issue was because of the knives (R. 149: 
13). It is undisputed that the knives were confiscated well before the K-9 unit arrived (R. 
149: 21). From Robertson's testimony, it appears that the knives were confiscated 
shortly after the initial stop (R. 149). 
After the preliminary hearing, Baker filed a motion to suppress (R. 37-40). 
Apparently, the State realized that from Robertson's testimony that there was no basis to 
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detain Baker, so the State subpoenaed the other three officers plus Robertson to testify at 
the hearing set for oral arguments (R. 67, 77-80, 150). At the unscheduled suppression 
hearing, Officer Bartell testified that one of the passengers voluntarily told him that he 
was in possession of a knife and voluntarily showed the knife to Bartell (R. 150: 9, 11). 
Bartell then asked if there were anymore knives, and then the passengers handed him a 
total of 13 knives (R. 150: 9-13). 
Officer Rockwood testified that he arrived on the scene after the other officer had 
begun confiscating the knives, and he was aware that the knives were turned over 
vbluntarily (R. 150: 15, 19, 21). Although Rockwood stated that he searched the 
passengers because of the knives, the passengers were not searched until after the K-9 
indicated on the vehicle, at least 12 minutes after the knives were already retrieved, and 
Rockwood later admitted that the passengers were searched because the K-9 indicated on 
the exterior of the vehicle (R. 150: 19, 20, 26). 
Bartell admitted that no one threatened him or did anything to make him fear for 
his safety (R. 150: 13). Rockwood admitted that none of the occupants were a threat to 
him, and his only concerns for officer safety were the concerns that are inherent in every 
traffic stop (R. 150: 21, 22-23). In fact, when specifically asked about the present stop, 
Rockwood agreed that there was nothing about the individuals or the situation that made 
him fear for his safety (R. 150: 22-23). Moreover, Officer Rockwood agreed that officer 
safety was not an issue or a reason for searching Baker (R. 150: 30). In fact, Rockwood 
testified that he was searching Baker because the dog indicated on the vehicle and that he 
was not concerned for his safety (R. 150: 30-31). 
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Applying these facts shows that the officers had no basis to-detain Baker. While 
the State asserts that the Terry frisk was appropriate, Baker asserts that the Terry frisk 
exception is not applicable for the reasons stated in his original brief (Aplt.Br. at 19-20). 
Even so, an officer may conduct a Terry frisk if the officer has articulable, reasonable 
suspicion that the person is both "armed and presently dangerous." Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 24, 27 (1968). To determine whether the frisk was reasonable, the Court looks at 
the totality of the circumstances, which is drawn from the officers' testimony and the trial 
court's ruling. See State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, 78 P.3d 590. 
None of the officers testified that they believed Baker or any of the other 
passengers were dangerous and had immediate access to weapons once the knives were 
confiscated (R. 149, 150). Moreover, the officers testified that the sole reason the search 
was conducted was because the dog indicated on the exterior of the vehicle and the 
search was for contraband; not for officer safety (R. 150: 19-20, 30-31). 
The trial court chose to disregard the 27 and 1/2 years of police experience the 
three officers initially on the scene testified to having and ignored their straightforward 
testimony that they were not concerned for their safety (R. 70, 149:5; 150: 8, 13, 14, 22-
23, 30). The State also urges this Court to ignore the combined 27 and 1/2 years of police 
experience and find, despite the officers plain testimony, that they should have been 
concerned for their safety and such safety concerns justified them in frisking Baker. 
The officers new very well, more so than any attorney or other individual not at 
the traffic stop on November 24, 2004, that there are inherent dangers during every traffic 
stop and that it was dark with five occupants in the vehicle. The officer also new, better 
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than any other individual not at the traffic stop, that 13 knives were confiscated.2 With 
all these facts before the officers, and considering the decades of combined experience, 
the officers were not concerned for their safety and searched Baker only because the dog 
indicated on the exterior of the vehicle. 
Baker asserts that the officers, while their view is subjective, are in the best 
situation to provide the basis for an objective view of the situation. Even if this Court 
finds otherwise, the officers failed to do anything to alleviate further safety concerns, and 
instead continued to detain the passengers in the vehicle for at least 12 minutes and 
finally only searched Baker for drugs.3 This detention was unreasonable and violated 
Baker's rights. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Baker asks 
this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling and order the evidence be suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of December, 2006. 
Aaron P. Dodd 
Counsel for Appellant 
2
 While the State asserts that there was a basis to believe Baker was armed and presently 
dangerous due to the driver's drug involvement, there was no indication that the driver or any 
passenger possessed or recently used drugs. 
3
 Even the Court in Warren, 2003 UT 36 at U's27-29, acknowledged that safety risks are 
mitigated if the persons are ordered out of the vehicle, not detained in the vehicle. 
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